



AFRICA ELECTIONS MONITOR

Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire & Tanzania

Post-Election Brief

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CAMEROON



1.0 Post-Election Overview

The October 12, 2025, presidential election in Cameroon has sparked unrest following a series of ongoing protests and deepened concerns about the country's political future. Official results declared President Paul Biya, aged 92, the winner with 53.66% of the vote, extending his decades-long rule into an eighth term. However, opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary aged 76, rejected the outcome, unilaterally declaring victory days before the official announcement and calling for a three-day lockdown in protest. Major cities like Douala, Garoua, and Maroua were left deserted as shops closed and transport halted. In Yaoundé, food prices skyrocketed, and reports of violence spread, with civil society groups saying as many as 23 people have been killed during the protests. There have been reports of deaths, with several people injured and arrested. There has also been a restriction on the media after ELECAM declared Paul Biya as the winner.



2.0 Current Situation

The election has intensified two major challenges for Cameroon: one is a legitimacy crisis, as opposition groups and civil society organisations claim irregularities and manipulation of the state's electoral process. The second is a succession crisis, given President Biya's age and the absence of a clear transition plan. Analysts note that the narrow margin of victory shows a weakening support for Biya, but also warn that the government's keen suppression of protests risks fueling instability. The Chatham House report stresses that Cameroon's future stability depends on credible elections and an orderly constitutional transition to avoid a potentially chaotic power struggle when Biya eventually leaves office. These developments emerge amid Cameroon's pre-

existing security challenges, which include — longstanding anglophone separatist conflict in the Northwest and Southwest regions, organized criminal activities in the north, and Lake Chad basin spillover — that raise the risk of escalation by existing armed groups.

Currently, the geopolitical implications of the ongoing unrest are diverse for Cameroon. Firstly, the loyalty of the army is unknown, a situation which resulted in Biya's reluctance to stage a brutal and widespread crackdown, fearing this may trigger a mutiny or military coup. In Bertoua and Garoua, police accused the army of standing by while an angry mob circled their station. But the government may have few options other than a crackdown – especially with Tchiroma still at large and Biya's inauguration rapidly approaching.

3.0. Implications for Nigeria

Cross-border Flows

With the high porosity of the Nigerian border with Cameroon (Adamawa and Borno to the North East, and Bakassi in Cross River State in the South), and the escalation following the unrest in the post-election polity. There is a possibility of a surge of refugee traffic and migration for safety into Nigeria, which is already faced with insecurity, terrorism, widespread poverty and resource constraints. In addition to the increased refugee inflows, organised crime and the proliferation of small arms will also occur, resulting in the worsening security and humanitarian situation in the border states- Adamawa, Borno, Cross River states, and the country at large. The highest risk is refugee flows into border states and increased activity by smugglers and opportunistic armed groups.

Diplomatic Intervention

Nigeria should swiftly assume its leadership role in the ongoing civil unrest in Cameroon by ensuring peace and the restoration of democratic governance. Nigeria can encourage inclusive dialogue between Cameroon's government, opposition, and civil society to address grievances and prevent escalation. In addition, Nigeria should engage with multilateral platforms including the African Union and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, to ensure the restoration of peace.

4.0 Recognition and Acceptance

Notable sovereign states have recognized the election in Cameroon and sent congratulatory messages to Paul Biya, these includes United States of America, though phrased in diplomatic language, congratulating his inauguration rather than election, the US, a proponent of democracy and rule of law, has effectively bolstered Paul Biya's international reputation following the polls. Meanwhile, the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has deemed the election a sham.

President Xi Jinping of China sent a congratulatory message to Paul Biya on his re-election as president of Cameroon. Saudi King, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the Amir of the state of Qatar, His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, congratulate Biya on his re-election.

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, notes the official proclamation by the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Cameroon on the final results of the presidential election of 12 October 2025. To this effect, the Chairperson extends congratulations to His Excellency Paul Biya on his victory, as the re-elected President of the Republic of Cameroon. However, the Chairperson is gravely concerned about the reported violence, repression and arrests of protesters and political actors in connection with the election results. The AUC Chairperson calls on all institutional and political actors to exercise restraint and work towards the preservation of social cohesion, peace and stability in Cameroon. He urges the Cameroonian authorities to accord topmost priority to inclusive national dialogue and consultation with all political stakeholders in order to reach consensus in the spirit of national unity, peace and collective security. The AUC Chairperson reaffirms the African Union's commitment to continue to support the people of Cameroon in the quest to consolidate democracy, social justice, and the rule of law.

Côte D'Ivoire



1.0 Post Election Overview

President Alassane Ouattara secured a fourth term in office, officially winning 89.77 % of the vote in the election held on 25 October 2025. Voter turnout was around 50 % of population, a significant decline compared with the high participated elections of previous years. Two major opposition figures: Laurent Gbagbo and Tidjane Thiam, were barred from running, raising concerns about the competitiveness of the race. Ouattara's closest challengers on the ballot, namely Jean-Louis Billon and Simone Gbagbo, received only about 3.09 % and 2.42 % of the vote respectively. Although the election proved largely peaceful compared with past contests, analysts and critics warn that the exclusion of key opposition figures and low turnout undermine the democratic legitimacy of the outcome.



Ouattara's win solidifies his control but the electoral conditions (exempting major opposition, low voters' turnout) raise questions about the legitimacy of the election. With low turnout and very high percentages for the winner, questions have arisen about how strongly the result reflects the will of all voters. President Alassane Ouattara came into power in 2010, and was reelected in 2015, 2020, and now 2020. He has however stated that this will be his final term in office, although there has been questions about whether his successor would be someone young that can transform the democratic climate in Cote D'Ivoire. There is potential for unrest. Although the result is decisive, the combination of exclusion, low turnout, and the dissatisfaction of the people could lead to protest and violence. Côte d'Ivoire is a major economic power house in Francophone West Africa and plays a critical role in regional security in the Sahel and international investment especially cocoa. So if there is tension and unrest in the country, it would affect other states especially in terms of trade and investment.

2.0 Current Situation

Ouattara's detractors accuse the leader of taking the country down an authoritarian path in which he chooses his electoral opponents. Many voters abstained amid widespread anger over his decision to run for a fourth consecutive term. Under the constitution, presidents may only serve a maximum of two terms, but Ouattara argues his limit was "reset" by a 2016 constitutional overhaul. In the weeks leading up to the election, sporadic protests broke out in response to the ban on key contenders from the polls, prompting the government to ban demonstrations and arrest more than 200 people from campaign group the Common Front. In the postelection transition heading into Ouattara's inauguration the stakes lies in Ouattara uniting a deeply divided nation through deep political consolidation in convincing his critics.



3.0. Implications for Nigeria

Security Ties

Ouattara's campaign was heavily focused on security at a time of rising regional instability and this offers greater opportunity for Nigeria as a strategic partner to deep security collaboration in West Africa and the Sahel. Alassane Ouattara enters his fourth term as violence threatens to spill over from Sahel neighbours Mali and Burkina Faso, where armed groups such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the ISIL affiliate in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have been conducting a violent rampage. Ouattara's government, since 2022, has boosted the defence budget, increased troop deployments in the northern regions neighbouring the Sahel.

4.0 Recognition and Acceptance

The United States has officially congratulated Alassane Ouattara on his re-election as President of Ivory Coast, reaffirming its support for democracy and stability in the West African nation. French

President Emmanuel Macron congratulated Ouattara on his re-election and called for continued "deepening" of the partnership between the two countries.

The African Union and the ECOWAS have congratulated Côte d'Ivoire for the peaceful conduct of the presidential election, which returned President Alassane Ouattara to office for a fourth term.

Tanzania



Tanzania's general elections including presidential, parliamentary and local ward elections were conducted on 29 October 2025. President Samia Suluhu Hassan who came into power in 2021 after the death of her predecessor John Magufuli was aiming for her first full elected term was declared the winner with approximately 97.66 % of the vote. The election was marred by reports of opposition suppression, as major challengers from CHADEMA and ACT-Wazalendo were either jailed or disqualified before voting began. Following the announcement of results, violent protests broke out across major cities, with security forces accused of using live ammunition against demonstrators. Human rights groups and the UN reported multiple deaths, while the government imposed a nationwide curfew, and heavy military presence to restore normalcy. The African Union and other observers criticized the election for falling short of democratic standards, citing ballot irregularities and the exclusion of opposition agents from polling stations. Hassan was later sworn in at a restricted military venue in Dodoma rather than a public ceremony. Opposition leaders have rejected the results as fraudulent and called for fresh elections, warning that the government risks undermining national stability and eroding public trust in Tanzania's democratic institutions.



2.0 Current Situation

Tanzania have been engulfed by post-election protests, indications of significant violence are slowly emerging as an internet blackout is partially lifted. Opposition figures claim hundreds died. Human rights groups confirm "mass killings" but say they have been unable to verify exact numbers. Report by international and local observers who were in Tanzania to observe the election have claimed that the election was not free and fair, marred by low turnout, and rigging in favor of Samia Suluhu. Reports also claimed that when they tried to point out these concerns they were abducted, threatened, tortured and forced to delete any photos or videos they had captured as evidence by Tanzania police.



3.0. Implications for Nigeria

Diplomatic Intervention

Nigeria and Tanzania have enjoyed cordial diplomatic relations since the two countries attained independence in 1960 and 1961 respectively. The bilateral relations between the two countries are hinged upon shared vision, mission and values in Pan-African affairs. Nigeria and Tanzania played significant roles in the decolonization of the African continent. However, with the ongoing protest and violence in Tanzania, Nigeria should diplomatically engage the post-electoral civil unrest using the platform of the African Union especially, as a permanent member of the African Union Peace and Security Council.

4.0 Recognition and Acceptance

The African Union (AU) reported that the Tanzania elections failed to comply with democratic standards adding to mounting international pressure on President Samia Suluhu Hassan's administration. The AU pointed to ballot stuffing, the government-imposed internet blackout, allegations of excessive military force, and politically-motivated abductions as "compromising election integrity". The election "did not comply with AU principles, normative frameworks, and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections", the mission's report concluded, adding that the environment was "not conducive to peaceful conduct and acceptance of electoral outcomes". The AU's mission urged Tanzanian authorities to exercise restraint and pursue "thorough investigations" into violence against protesters.

The AU report came amid another rebuke from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) earlier this week, which detailed violence, censorship and "general intimidation" of the public and opposition figures. Overall, "voters could not express their democratic will", SADC said in a preliminary report adding that the elections "fell short" of SADC principles.

The African Electoral Monitor research report was compiled by the *Election & Governance* desk of the Gen. LEO Irabor, Early Warning System Centre, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, Nigeria.

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